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Abstract
This study examines the effect of current asset tunneling on firm performance from the emerging 
market perspective. Although tunneling activities is a common practices by businesses especially 
in Indonesia, there exist obstacles in the measurement of tunneling activity because it is difficult 
to proof the existence of such practices. In this study, we measure tunneling by using accounts 
receivables and develop tunneling detection criteria. In addition, this study examines the effect of 
tunneling on firm performance and market reaction during the announcement of the related party 
transaction. The study finds that from the perspective of the being-tunneled companies, receivables 
to related parties negatively affect the company’s profit margin. Companies which announce related 
party transaction indicating tunneling obtain negative abnormal return during the announcement of 
the related party transaction.
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Abstrak
Penelitian ini menguji pengaruh tunneling aset lancar pada kinerja perusahaan pada perspektif 
negara berkembang. Meskipun aktivitas tunneling terjadi dalam praktik bisnis di Indonesia, tetapi 
terdapat kesulitan untuk mengukurnya karena aktivitas tunneling sulit dibuktikan. Penelitian ini 
membangun kriteria deteksi tunneling. Penelitian ini juga menguji pengaruh tunneling pada kinerja 
perusahaan dan reaksi pasar modal pada saat pengumuman transaksi pihak berelasi. Penelitian 
ini menemukan bahwa dari perspektif perusahaan yang di-tunnel, piutang kepada pihak berelasi 
berpengaruh negatif terhadap kinerja perusahaan. Perusahaan yang mengumumkan transaksi pihak 
berelasi yang terindikasi tunneling mendapatkan return negatif.
Kata kunci: current asset tunneling, related party transaction, firm performance, emerging 
market
INTRODUCTION
Tunneling is a transfer of resources out 
of the company for the benefit of controlling 
shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000). In 
a concentrated ownership structure, the 
controlling shareholders might take advantage 
of their control to expropriate minority 
shareholders’ wealth (La Porta et al. 2000; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1997), through activities 
such as tunneling. Controlling shareholders 
have the power to set corporate policy to obtain 
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them. It is not surprising that most previous 
studies of tunneling focused on market 
reactions at the time of the announcements of 
related party transactions (Bae et al. 2002; 
Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a; 
Faccio and Stolin 2006; Peng et al. 2011) or 
used the level of related party transactions 
as a proxy for tunneling (Gao and Kling 
2008; Juliarto et al. 2013). The usage of the 
level of related party transactions to measure 
tunneling is problematic because companies 
conduct related party transactions not only for 
opportunistic reasons but also for efficiency 
reasons. It is for this reason that, in this study 
we develop tunneling detection criteria.
The following is an illustration of 
a tunneling activity using related party 
transactions that could decrease company’s 
financial performance. Public company in 
Indonesia, namely MI2 in this case is 
considered to be performing tunneling activity 
in the form of coal price manipulation by KC. 
KC employs a special purpose company that is 
RL in Cayman Island to transfer profits. Here 
is the structure of corporate ownership:
KC and RL are subsidiaries of MI. GB is 
the ultimate owner3  of MI. KC does not sell 
coal directly to potential buyers; instead, they 
sell it to RL below market price, thus causes a 
decline in KC earnings. Then, RL resells the 
coal at market price to potential buyers, thereby 
increasing profits to RL. In this case, KC is 
tunneled company. Local Government K, KC 
non-controlling shareholder, is harmed by the 
transaction. While the controlling shareholder 
(GB) as a whole benefits from the transaction, 
due to losses incurred in KC, it can be covered 
by higher profits in RL. These transactions are 
classified as cash flow tunneling because: (1) 
the transaction leads to a transfer of resources 
out of the firm in the form of liquid assets; and 
2Code for ethical purpose
3Ultimate owners concept consider direct and indirect 
ownership in public companies. Direct ownership is the 
percentage of shares owned by shareholders on behalf 
of him. Indirect ownership is ownership through the 
ownership chain. With ultimate ownership, major share-
holders are traced in the major shareholders, and so on, 
until ultimate owners are identified.
benefits from the related party transaction. 
Some empirical evidences have suggested 
that related party transactions can be used 
for expropriation through tunneling activities 
(Aharony et al. 2010; Berkman et al. 2009; 
Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a; Gao 
and Kling 2008; Jian and Wong 2003; Juliarto 
et al. 2013).
As to date, most of the studies undertaken 
on expropriation focus mainly on tunneling 
activities in countries with high levels of 
corporate governance and developed countries 
(Bae et al. 2002; Faccio and Stolin 2006; 
Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a). 
However, in developing counties, such 
tunneling receives little attention (Juliarto 
et al. 2013). Tunneling can occur in country 
with high and low levels of corporate 
governance (Johnson et al. 2000). Nenova 
(2003) states that controlling shareholders in 
companies operating in countries with a low 
level of corporate governance policies have 
more chances to expropriate the minority 
shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, our study 
focuses on the expropriation1  of noncontrolling 
shareholders through tunneling activity 
in countries with low levels of corporate 
governance and emerging economy.
Indonesia is an interesting case to be 
examined for this research considering 
governance issues, such as related party 
lending and crony capitalism. It is one of the 
institutional problems behind the 1997 Asian 
crisis. Moreover, Indonesia is a developing 
country having such characteristics low level 
of investor protection, low law enforcement, 
and group structures. These characteristics 
lead to related party transactions that could 
benefit the group members and at the end will 
destroy the value of the firm (Khanna and 
Palepu 2000).
One of the obstacles in studying 
tunneling activities is the difficulty to measure 
them. Although these activities are occurring 
in business practices, it is difficult to prove 
1Expropriation is defined as the process of using one’s 
control powers to maximize own welfare and redistri-
bute wealth from others (Claessens et al. 2000b).
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(2) the transaction is beneficial to controlling 
shareholders at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders. Cash flow tunneling transaction 
can also be employed as tax avoidance because 
it is a way to tunnel profits from Indonesia to 
Cayman Island which is a tax heaven country. 
The motivation of controlling shareholders to 
transfer profit from KC to RL is because their 
cash flow right in RL is greater than in KC. A 
cash flow right is financial claim of controlling 
shareholders to the company (La Porta et al. 
1999).
Almost all public companies in Indonesia 
perform related party transactions (Sari 2013). 
Indonesia has group structure and low levels 
of law enforcement. These leads to abusive 
related party transactions which will benefit 
group members while at the end destroy the 
value of the firm (Khanna and Palepu 2000). 
Poor law enforcement in Indonesia makes 
tunneling cases untouched by the law (Sari 
2013). If not controlled, tunneling can lead to 
reduction in investor confidence and financial 
crisis as it happened in the Asian financial 
crisis 1997.
Cheung et al. (2006), Cheung et al. 
(2009b) and Jian and Wong (2003) found 
that there were several ways for companies 
to conduct tunneling through related party 
transactions. For example, a company 
can provide a great number of accounts 
receivables, long credit periods, warranty to 
related party’s receivables, or writes-off of 
related party receivables. A receivable given to 
a related party can be treated as a put option, 
in which a related party can exercise such an 
option by not paying the receivable in a bad 
situation (Atanasov et al. 2008). Provision 
and elimination of related party loans will, in 
effect, decrease a company’s net earnings. The 
focus of this study is to examine the tunneling 
hypothesis whether a receivable to a related 
party is employed as a tunnel to transfer 
resource out from the company which hampers 
company’s performance. 
Figure 1
Illustration of Tunneling Activity
Source: Announcements of Affiliation and Conflict of Interest Transactions, Capital Market and Financial Institutions Regulatory 
Bodies 2009
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
The theory used to explain the occurrence 
of tunneling activity is the agency theory. In 
this theory, a concentrated ownership structure 
– a common phenomenon in many companies 
around the world – has been suggested as one 
of the leading indicators of an agency problem 
between controlling and non-controlling 
shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). In this process, the controlling 
shareholders might take advantage of their 
control to expropriate non-controlling’s wealth.
Expropriation of non-controlling share-
holders by the controlling shareholders is 
principal agency conflict in the concentrated 
ownership company. Expropriation arises when 
there is a separation of cash flow rights and 
control rights. A cash flow right is a financial 
claim of shareholders to the company (La Porta 
et al. 1999). Control rights are voting rights to 
participate in determining the company’s key 
policies (La Porta et al. 1999). The incentive 
and ability to perform such expropriation will 
be greater if the controlling shareholders have 
control rights in excess of the cash flow (Gugler 
and Yurtoglu 2003). Cash flow rights leverage 
on controlling shareholders leading to high 
likelihood of agency conflicts. A cash flow 
right leverage is a deviation between cash flow 
rights with the rights of control. The increase in 
control right over cash flow rights is performed 
by controlling shareholders through a variety 
of mechanisms such as pyramid holdings, 
cross-ownership (La Porta et al. 1999). The 
ability of the controlling shareholders to use 
cash flow rights leverage to expropriate even 
greater if the controlling shareholder is also 
involved in management. Controlling shareholder 
involvement in management causes it not only 
able to influence the policy of the company, but 
also to have flexibility to use the right control 
for the private benefit (La Porta et al. 1999).
Tunneling is generally defined as the agency 
problem between a controlling shareholder and 
minority shareholders. Controlling shareholders 
can implement policies that benefit them at 
the expense of minority shareholders (La 
Porta et al. 2000) through contractual policies 
with related parties i.e. tunneling (Gilson and 
Gordon 2003). Tunneling is divided into two 
types:
1. Controlling shareholder can move resources 
from the company to its interests through 
self-dealing transaction. The transaction 
either illegal or fraud. Examples of self-
dealing transaction are sales of assets 
through contracts such as transfer pricing 
that benefit the controlling shareholders, 
excessive executive compensation, loan 
guarantees to related parties, etc.
2. Controlling shareholders can increase their 
ownership in the company without giving/
transfer of assets through dilutive share 
issues, minority freeze-outs, insider trading, 
creeping acquisitions and other transactions 
that harm noncontrolling shareholders.
Atanasov et al. (2008) divide tunneling 
into three types of equity tunneling, asset 
tunneling and cash flow tunneling: (1) Equity 
tunneling increases the controller’s share 
of the firm but does not directly affect the 
firm’s productive assets. Examples of equity 
tunneling are dilutive offerings, freeze-outs 
of minority shareholders, and insider trading; 
(2) Asset tunneling comprises the transfer of 
productive, long-term tangible or intangible 
assets from the firm to the related party for 
less than market values, such that the transfer 
has a permanent effect on firm operations; (3) 
Cash flow tunneling is transfer cash flow out 
from the company, including transfer pricing 
(sale of outputs to related party below-market 
prices; or purchase of inputs from related 
party at above-market prices) and excessive 
executive salaries or perquisite consumption.
Companies conduct related party 
transactions for three motives; to minimize 
transaction costs (Cook 1977; Fisman and 
Khanna 1998), to manipulate earnings (Jian 
and Wong 2003; Aharony et al. 2010), and 
to tunnel or prop-up (Cheung et al. 2009a; 
Cheung et al. 2009b; Cheung et al. 2006; 
Juliarto et al. 2013). Tunneling results in 
transactions that are a priori likely to result in 
expropriation of minority shareholders such as 
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asset transactions, trading relationship, equity 
transactions, account receivables or loan 
guaranties (Cheung et al. 2009a). Propping are 
transactions likely to benefit the listed firm’s 
minority shareholders such as cash receipts by 
the listed company (Cheung et al. 2009a).
Some studies indicate that related party 
transaction is used for tunneling purposes. Jian 
and Wong (2003) found that the company uses 
receivables to related parties as a tunnel to 
transfer resources out of the company. Cheung 
et al. (2009b) find empirical evidence that the 
sale and purchase of assets to related party are 
used to perform tunneling. Asset tunneling 
occurs when the firm acquires assets from 
related parties at above market prices or sell 
asset to related parties at below market prices.
Receivables to related party transaction 
can be used to conduct tunneling (Cheung et 
al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009a). Jian and Wong 
(2003) state that there are two ways to do 
tunneling. First, the company provides a high 
accounts receivable or long credit period to the 
related party when selling the product. Second, 
the company provides the loan to the related 
party (in the financial statements included in 
other receivables post). A loan to controlling 
shareholders and affiliates is one way of 
controlling shareholders to transfer resources 
to their interests.
Jian and Wong (2003) find empirical 
evidence that when firms have high free 
cash flows, they will tunnel the excess of 
such resources for the benefit of controlling 
shareholders through the provision of credits. 
Aharony et al. (2010) provide empirical 
evidence on tunneling activities in China 
through a credit transaction to related parties 
after the IPO. Receivables to related parties 
can also be understood as a put option; related 
parties can exercise such option by not paying 
their loan in a bad state (Atanasov et al. 2008).
Jian and Wong (2003) and Aharony et al. 
(2010) find empirical evidence that companies 
that have excess resources will  transfer some 
of the resources for the benefit of controlling 
shareholders through related party receivables. 
We predict that receivables to related parties as 
a tunnel transfer resources for the benefit of the 
controlling shareholders. If credit to related 
party is used for tunneling, the company will 
provide a larger loan to related parties. In 
addition, the company will provide credits 
to related parties at lower interest rates than 
market rates. Providing credits to related party 
under the market interest rate will decrease 
net earnings. Also, warranties and write-offs 
of related party receivables will negatively 
affect company profits. Lo et al. (2010) found 
that tunneling through unfair transaction 
decrease being-tunneled profit. Utama and 
Utama (2009) that the stock price reaction (as 
measured by CAR) for RPT is lower than that 
for Non-RPT.
H1: Receivables to related party negatively 
affect performance of tunneled 
company.
Companies that conduct related party 
transactions considered as tunneling have 
values decreased at the announcement 
of the transaction (Cheung et al. 2006; 
Cheung et al. 2009a). It has been found 
that market participants react negatively to 
announcements of related party transactions 
which have indications of tunneling (Bae et 
al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 
2009a; Faccio and Stolin 2006; Peng et al. 
2011). Previous studies found that minority 
shareholders experienced large value of losses 
after the announcements of such related party 
transactions by publicly listed firms, which led 
to a suggestion of expropriation of minority 
shareholders.
H2: There is negative abnormal return 
during the announcement of the 
tunneling transactions for the tunneled 
company.
METHODOLOGY
The observation periods applied in this 
study were from 2009-2011. The lists of 
the companies were obtained from the IDX 
Fact Books 2009, 2010 and 2011 (Indonesia 
Stock Exchange 2009; 2010; 2011). There 
were nine industry classifications of listed 
companies on the IDX. In this study, finance 
classified companies that were listed on the 
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Variables and Measurement
The dependent variable of this study is 
net profit margin. Account receivables which 
are provided to related parties with soft credit 
terms (i.e. below market interest rates and 
longer loan period) have negative impacts on 
net income. Moreover, uncollectible related 
party receivables will also impact on the 
company’s net profit.
The independent variable is account 
receivables resulting from related party 
transactions. Related party transaction is a 
transfer of resources, services or obligations 
between a reporting entity with related parties, 
regardless of whether or not there is a price 
that is charged (IAI 2010).
Net receivables are the differences 
between accounts receivable and account 
payables. Cheung et al. (2009a) classifies 
accounts receivable to related party as tunneling 
transactions while account payables on related 
party as propping transactions. Direct cash 
payments by the listed firm to related parties 
are almost certainly tunneling. Receivables 
to related party transactions are associated 
with negative market reactions on average. 
On the other hand, when firms receive direct 
cash infusions or loan guarantees from their 
controlling shareholders, they are likely to be 
benefiting from these transactions. Firms that 
receive cash assistance from related parties 
earn highly positive and significant excess 
returns. These transactions are classified as 
propping (Cheung et al. 2009a).
IDX during 2009 to 2011 were excluded since 
they were subjects to specific financial sector 
regulations, and hence were not attuned to other 
companies in the other eight classifications 
(i.e. agriculture; mining; basic industry 
and chemicals; miscellaneous industry; 
consumer goods industry; property, real estate 
and building construction; infrastructure, 
utilities and transportation; trade, services 
and investment). There were 399, 407, and 
428 companies listed on the IDX during 
2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively. After the 
exclusion of the finance-classified companies, 
the remaining listed companies, which were 
used in this study, were 332, 338, and 357 
during 2009, 2010, and 2011 respectively.
Data were obtained from annual reports 
and announcements of affiliations and conflicts 
of interest transactions from Capital Market and 
Financial Institutions Regulatory Bodies. Data 
were obtained from capital market regulatory 
body database, IDX websites and on the listed 
companies’ websites. Announcements of 
affiliation and conflict of interest transaction 
reports includes detail information on affiliate 
and conflicts of interest transactions such as 
objects of transactions, transaction values, 
transaction dates, announcement dates, and 
description of the relationship between two 
parties. Daily stock price data were obtained 
from Realtime Data Investment (RTI) at the 
Economics and Business Faculty, Gadjah 
Mada University.
Table 1
Measurement of Account Receivables to Related Parties
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Hence, net receivables measure how more 
likely companies do tunneling than propping. 
Positive net receivables show that account 
receivables are greater than account payables, 
meaning that the company has a higher 
propensity to do tunneling than propping. 
Tunneling Detection Criteria
To test Hypothesis 2, we develop 
tunneling detection criteria to identify which 
related party transactions are classified as 
tunneling activities and which are not. Related 
party transactions are categorized as tunneling 
based on the following characteristics:
a. There are indications that related party 
transaction is for tunneling purposes. 
Cheung et al. (2006) and Cheung et al. 
(2009b) found that asset transactions, cash 
payments, receivable transactions, loan 
guarantees, and trading transactions to 
related parties had high tendencies toward 
tunneling activities. These transactions 
could be used to tunnel resources out to its 
related parties through unfair pricing, and 
thus lowering the value of the company at 
the expense of minority shareholders.
b. There is a similarity of controlling owners4 
between company and related party. 
Goranova (2007) found that the controlling 
owner will transfer resources from the 
company’s low cash flow rights into the 
company’s high cash flow rights.
c. It has similar directors and commissioners 
for the company and the related party. 
Similar key management personnel provide 
the opportunity of using power to regulate 
the financial policies and operations, so as 
to obtain benefits from such activities.
d. There are family relationships between 
company and related party. Identification for 
family relationship transactions obtain from 
announcements of affiliations and conflicts 
of interest transactions from Capital Market 
4The controlling shareholder (controlling shareholder) 
is an individual, a family, or institution that has control 
of a company either directly or indirectly on the cut-
off level (cut-off) certain control rights (Claessens et al. 
2000b). The controlling shareholder is also known as 
the greatest ultimate owner.
and Financial Institutions Regulatory 
Bodies. This report allows us to identify the 
ultimate ownership (see Figure 1 and Figure 
2) and the relationship between related 
parties. A public company is categorized 
as a company controlled by a family if the 
largest shareholder is an individual or family 
at the level of certain control rights. La 
Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000a), 
and Faccio and Stolin (2006) identify 
families based on common last names and 
relationships of marriages. Company policy 
can be influenced by the family.
e. These transactions are not considered by 
the Office of Appraisal Services. Office 
of Appraisal Services is engaged in the 
valuation of the property/assets.
Empirical Model
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the following 
equation, where NPM is net profit margin, IP is 
industry performance, IT is industry type, and 
AR is account receivables to related party.
NPM = α11 + α12AR + α13IP + α14IT +e …… (1)
In order for us to test for Hypothesis 2, 
we determine whether a certain RPT can be 
classified as tunneling using the tunneling 
detection criteria. Then, we measure abnormal 
return around the announcement of tunneling 
transaction in which return expectations are 
calculated using the mean-adjusted model as 
follows:
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Analysis made for the period of 2009 to 
2011 on the IDX websites and on the listed 
companies’ websites found announcements of 
affiliation and conflict of interest transactions 
made or related to 74 companies. Assessments 
based on the tunneling detection criteria showed 
55 transactions which were indicated as asset 
tunneling transactions, 3 transactions which 
were indicated as equity tunneling transactions 
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and 16 transactions which appeared to be 
propping  transactions5. This study focuses 
on current asset tunneling, and therefore, 27 
being-tunneled companies were included for 
further analysis. Descriptive statistics for the 
companies based on the tunneling model used 
in this study are presented in Table 2.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that, from the 
perspective of the tunneled companies, 
receivables to related parties negatively affect 
the performance of the company. The empirical 
results of equation 1-6 are reported in Table 3.
In the first model, receivables to related 
party are negative and significant at 1% alpha. 
In the second model, net-receivables of related 
party transaction are negative and significant 
at alpha 1%. The test results show that firms 
which have account receivables greater than 
account payables will decrease the company’s 
performance. In the third measurement, change 
receivables to related parties are negative and 
significant coefficient on alpha 1%. The test 
results show that firms in the period t gives 
receivables greater than the previous period 
(t-1) will decrease the company’s net profit 
5Propping transactions are transactions that are seem-
ingly beneficial for minority shareholders, although 
their real benefits are difficult to judge since the nature 
of the transactions are often concealed.
margin. Empirical evidence, as shown in Table 
1, shows that hypothesis 1 is supported that 
receivables to related parties negatively affect 
the company’s net profit margin.
This finding is consistent with Bertrand 
et al. (2002) and Cheung et al. (2006), which 
found that companies experienced decreasing 
profitability when they performed tunneling 
transactions such as provisions of credits to 
related parties.
Analysis made for the period of 2009 to 
2011 on the IDX websites and on the listed 
companies’ websites found announcements of 
affiliation and conflict of interest transactions 
made by 74 companies. Assessments based 
on the tunneling detection criteria showed 27 
transactions were identified as current asset 
tunneling, such as elimination of related party 
transactions to related parties (9 transactions), 
receivable to related parties  (10 transactions), 
and warranty account receivables (8 
transactions).
Companies which announce current 
asset tunneling transaction obtain negative 
abnormal return (AR) negative at the time of 
announcement of the transaction to the period 
of the window (-3, +3).
On the average, during the window period 
(-3, +3), current asset tunneling obtains mean 
Table 2
Descriptive Statistics
                                                 Tunneled Companies 
Variable Mean Max Min Median SD 
Return on Assets 0.89 40.56 -0.08 0.07 5.6
Net Profit Margin 0.06 0.29 -0.56 0.006 0.14
Table 3
The Influence of Related Party Transaction on Financial Performance
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Receivables to 
Related Party 
Transaction (RPT)
-0.826*** -0.943*** -0.047* -0.127*** -0.149*** -0.060***
Industry Performance 33.484** 33.493** 32.787** 33.376** 33.643** 34.065**
Industry Type 12.256*** 11.701*** -4.442** 13.032*** -4.624** -4.405**
R2 4.6% 4.4% 1.4% 5% 4.9% 3.3%
*** significant at alpha 1%, ** significant at alpha 5%, * significant at alpha 10%
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adjusted abnormal return negative. Elimination 
of related party receivables obtains a mean 
adjusted abnormal return of -0.66%, account 
receivables to related parties gain -6.7% and 
warranty account receivables from related 
parties obtain -1.2%. This result is consistent 
with H2.
Based on the tunneling detection criteria, 
the following are examples of transactions 
which are indicated as current asset tunneling. 
The researchers used the code for ethical 
reasons. A public company in Indonesia, namely 
PT ED through DD conduct transactions with 
MM, family GQ as controlling shareholder of 
PT ED and MM. Figure 2 shows the nature of 
the related party transactions of PT ED/DD 
with MM.
PT ED and MM have the same 
commissioners and directors. The 
commissioners and directors are family 
members of the controlling shareholders.
On June 26, 2009, through the subsidiary 
of PT ED, DD, has signed a purchase agreement 
with MM to take over 99.9% of DTA and 
99.9% of the DTI. PT ED also pays off the 
entire debt of DTA and the DTI to MM. Total 
Table 4
Cumulative Abnormal Return at the Time of Announcement of Receivables to Related 
Party 2009-2010
Transaction Mean Adjusted,  (-3,+3)  
CURRENT ASSET TUNNELING:
1  Elimination of related party receivables -0,00669
2  Account receivables to related party -0,06755
3  Warranty account receivables -0,01284
PT ED
ST ECE Public
EC SC
Family GQ
DD
CODMIN
MM
DTA DTI
11,65% 36,76
60,6% 39,4%
50,7%
100%
100%
0,9
90%
10%
Transaction
 Figure 2
Ownership Structure PT ED
Source: Announcements of Affiliation and Conflict of Interest Transactions, Capital Market and Financial 
Institutions Regulatory Bodies 2009
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amount of the transaction and subrogation 
agreed was US$ 886,013 in which US$ 75,122 
was used to buy shares of DTA and DTI and 
a total of US$ 810,891 was used to repay the 
debt of DTA and the DTI to MM.
Family GQ had 100% cash flow rights 
in MM and 50.7% cash flow rights in PT ED. 
Cash flow rights of controlling shareholders 
were greater in MM than in a public company 
(PT ED). The difference in cash flow rights was 
an incentive for companies to tunnel resources 
out from PT ED to MM.
Based on tunneling detection criteria, 
transaction of PT ED was indicated as current 
asset tunneling. Indicators are:
1. There was a negative abnormal return 
during the announcement of the transaction 
(-0.01079). Tunneled company and minority 
shareholders suffered losses as a result of 
the transaction.
2. Debt payment for related party credit 
and purchase share of loss that company 
owned by related parties were classified as 
tunneling (Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 
2009b).
3. There were similarity of controlling 
shareholders between companies and 
related parties. PT ED and MM/DTI/DTA 
are owned by the same owner, GQ.
4. Both companies have same key management 
personal.
The information to develop tunneling 
detection criteria were obtained from 
announcements of affiliation and conflict of 
interest transaction. However, disclosures 
contained in the notes to the financial statements 
of company PT ED did not provide clear and 
detailed information about the relationships 
between the company and its related parties, 
the ultimate ownership structures of the 
companies involved in this transaction and the 
detailed description of the transaction. Low 
quality of disclosure led to a high likelihood of 
abusive related party transactions. 
CONCLUSION
This study found the expropriation 
phenomenon through contractual policies 
with other parties, whereas past research 
focused on expropriation through operations 
policies. Expropriation can occur through 
related party transactions. This study found 
empirical evidence that account receivables 
to related party can be used as a tunnel to 
transfer resources out of the company to the 
controlling’s interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders. Tunneled companies will 
experience a decrease in financial and market 
performances. These results are consistent with 
the phenomenon of expropriation of minority 
shareholders through contractual policies. 
Controlling shareholders in companies 
operating in countries with a low level of 
investor protection policies have more chances 
to expropriate the minority shareholders’ 
wealth (Nenova 2003). The overall finding 
of this study indicates that tunneling occurs 
at companies in countries with low levels of 
investor protection. Moreover, disclosures 
of related party transaction are prepared in 
a minimal way. Disclosures of related party 
transactions are set forth in PSAK No. 7 of 
2010. However, the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosures of public companies in 
Indonesia on the financial statement items is 
still low, especially in the case of disclosure of 
related party transactions (Khomsiyah 2005).
There are some implications that can be 
gained from this study, especially for capital 
market regulators who could play a significant 
role in improving disclosures through more 
effective regulation and for potential investors, 
for accountants and executives who have 
significant roles in enhancing the knowledge 
of companies in the areas disclosures and 
tunneling. The limitations of this study that 
should be considered is sample used in this 
study are limited, and hence the generalizability 
of the findings should be treated cautiously.
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